Abstract-Littlewood [1] introduced the idea that software may be possibly perfect and that we can contemplate its probability of (im)perfection. We review this idea and show how it provides a bridge between correctness, which is the goal of software verification (and especially formal verification), and the probabilistic properties such as reliability that are the targets for systemlevel assurance. We enumerate the hazards to formal verification, consider how each of these may be countered, and propose relative weightings that an assessor may employ in assigning a probability of perfection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Using formal methods to find errors in designs or programs provides immediate satisfaction and measurable payoff. The same is true for some other applications of mechanized formal methods such as generating test cases, and synthesizing monitors. But what about formal verification? This was the original application for formal methods, and the motivation for much early research in the field, but proving the absence of errors seems now to attract less interest than revealing their presence. Part of the reason is surely that the claim to "prove the absence of errors" is overly broad and must be circumscribed with numerous caveats concerning the fidelity of models, validity of assumptions, soundness of deduction, and so on.
Another part of the reason may be that the claims we want to make at the system level are usually probabilistic (e.g., no more than so much downtime per year, no more than so many failures of a certain severity in the lifetime of the system, and so on) and it is not obvious how the absolute claims of formal verification can be used to support these. This paper examines these topics and considers the claims supported by formal verification and their relation to systemlevel assurance, particularly for critical systems. In Section 2, drawing on the background to the results reported in [2] , we describe probabilistic assessments of software, including the traditional notions of reliability and the novel idea of "possible perfection." We then describe aleatory and epistemic probabilities of perfection, and their utility in system-level assurance arguments. Section 3 considers the assessment of epistemic probabilities of perfection and the contribution of formal verification to this endeavor. We examine the issues that an assessor might face when employing evidence from formal verification to assign a probability of perfection. Section 4 concludes and offers suggestions for further research.
II. SOFTWARE PROBABILITIES AND THE IDEA OF POSSIBLE PERFECTION
Physical components of a complex system can wear out or break, possibly causing the system to fail. Failures can be graded according to the severity of their worst outcome, and it is usually required that there should be an inverse relationship between that severity and the likelihood of the failure. In commercial aircraft, for example, catastrophic failures are "those which would prevent continued safe flight and landing" [3, paragraph 6 .h(3)] and these are required to be "extremely improbable" [3, paragraph 7 .d], which is defined as being "so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one type" [3, paragraph 9 .e(3)]. If we consider the example of an airplane type with 100 members, each flying 3,000 hours per year over an operational life of 33 years, then we have a total exposure of about 10 7 flight hours. If hazard analysis reveals ten potentially catastrophic failures in each of ten subsystems, then the "budget" for each, if none are expected to occur in the life of the fleet, is a failure probability of about 10 −9
per hour [4, page 37] . This serves to explain the well-known 10 −9 requirement, which is stated as follows: "when using quantitative analyses. . . numerical probabilities. . . on the order of 10 −9 per flight-hour. . . based on a flight of mean duration for the airplane type may be used. . . as aids to engineering judgment. . . to. . . help determine compliance" (with the requirement for extremely improbable failure conditions) [3, paragraph 10.b] .
Software is a substantial component of many systems whose top-level safety requirements are stated probabilistically, as in the case of aircraft systems as described above. But software does not age or wear out, so how do its properties factor into a probabilistic assessment? Software contributes to system failures through faults in its requirements, design, or implementation, and these, in the language of safety analysis, produce "systematic failures," meaning they are not random but are certain to occur whenever circumstances activate the fault concerned. But although the failure is certain, given circumstances that activate the fault, those circumstances have a probability of occurrence: some faults are activated by almost any input, others require very specific, and unusual combinations of inputs. Hence, failure probabilities can be associated with software (and may be stated in terms of a failure rate, or a probability of failure on demand) and are determined by the likelihood of encountering circumstances that activate its faults.
For modest values, say down to about 10 −4 , it is feasible to measure software failure rates by statistically valid random testing [5] , [6] . Here, "statistically valid" means that the test case selection probabilities are exactly the same as those that are encountered in real operation. This kind of testing has been used to assess the reliability of a protection system for a nuclear reactor [7] .
But as we saw earlier, aircraft and some other systems have requirements that go to 10 −9 and beyond, and it is infeasible to measure these tiny rates by statistically valid random testing: Butler and Finelli demonstrate that a suitable test campaign could require 114,000 years [6] . One proposal for evading this problem is "N -version software," where N independently developed and deliberately "diverse" software components operate in parallel and their outputs are voted. Assuming that failures of the different versions are independent, a naïve analysis suggests this could improve matters exponentially: a combination of N systems, each with probability of failure p, could yield a combined failure rate of p N . Thus, the combination of three 10 −3 versions could achieve 10 −9 . This analysis is naïve in that it ignores the possibility of correlated failures, and both empirical [8] , [9] and theoretical [10] , [11] studies show that these simply cannot be ignored. If independent failures cannot be assumed, the probability of dependent failures must be measured-which is infeasible if it is small enough to be useful. For this and other reasons, the naïve idea of N -version software has largely been abandoned, but the use of deliberately simple software to "monitor" or "backup" a more complex software system is widely practiced; the reliability of these arrangements is a topic we will return to.
Because assessment by direct measurement of the very small failure rates required for critical systems is infeasible for software, standards and guidelines for such software essentially focus on processes and methods that are intended to ensure that the software is correct, rather than reliable. Thus, while the upper levels of aircraft system design and analysis are concerned with hazard analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, and probabilistic assessment [12] , [13] , the main focus of the DO-178B guidelines for airborne software [14] is on methods for ensuring that the software correctly implements its requirements. In common with most other software certification standards and guidelines, DO-178B identifies a hierarchy of "Design Assurance Levels" from E (lowest) to A (highest) and prescribes additional assurance activities at the higher levels: for example, there are 28 assurance "objectives" at Level D, 57 at Level C, 65 at Level B, and 66 at Level A. The difference in assurance objectives for Level A and Level B software prescribed by DO-178B is that Level A must be subjected to requirements-based testing that achieves a structural code coverage criterion called Modified Decision/Condition Coverage (MC/DC) [15] , whereas testing for Level B is required merely to achieve Decision Coverage (DC).
It seems reasonable that increasing the number of assurance objectives should increase confidence in the correctness of software, but it is not clear how this relates to its reliabilityyet the different design assurance levels are associated with probabilistic system-level assessments. Level A is considered appropriate for software that could lead to catastrophic failure conditions, while Levels B and C are appropriate for hazardous, and major failure conditions, respectively [13] . Major failure conditions are required to be "improbable," which may be quantified as 10 −5 [3, paragraph 10 .b] and, by interpolation, we may associate hazardous failure conditions with failure rates of the order 10 −7 . But what is it about the eight additional assurance objectives that Level B adds to those for Level C that reduce the assessed probability of failure from 10 −5 to 10 −7 , and how does the addition of MC/DC testing reduce this further to 10 −9 ? The last point seems particularly problematic, since testing to MC/DC coverage is a completely different kind of testing from the statistically valid testing used to assess reliability.
An insightful and original solution to this conundrum was introduced nearly a decade ago by Littlewood [1] . The idea is that the top-level claim made for critical software is not that it is reliable, but that it is perfect. Perfection means that the software will never suffer a failure no matter how much operational exposure it receives; it differs from correctness in that correctness is assessed relative to requirements, while perfection includes a judgment that the requirements are the right requirements (i.e., the detection of a failure is more primitive than noncompliance with requirements). Now, perfection is a strong claim and we may refuse to accept that software that has been assured to DO-178B Level A is perfect-but we may be willing to concede that it is possibly perfect. And we may further be persuaded that its possibility of perfection is greater than software that has been assured only to Level B. This suggests we could attach a probability to the possibility of perfection. We will refine these notions later, but one way to interpret this follows the spirit of [10] , [11] and invites us to think of all the software that might have been developed by comparable engineering processes to solve the same design problem as the software at hand; the probability of perfection is then the probability that any software randomly selected from this class is perfect. This probability will be partly dependent on the nature of the problem being solvedfor a "hard" problem it might be expected that the probability is smaller than for an "easier" problem-and partly on the quality of the software engineering and assurance methods employed.
Probability of perfection is attractive because it relates more naturally than reliability to the correctness-based assurance processes used for software. But probability of perfection can also be used to estimate reliability, as we will now show.
For simplicity, we assume a demand-based system, and will consider probability of failure rather than reliability. Then, by the formula for total probability P (s/w fails [on a randomly selected demand])
(1) = P (s/w fails | s/w perfect) × P (s/w perfect)
The first term in this sum is zero, because the software does not fail if it is perfect. We could, very conservatively, assume that the software always fails if it imperfect. Hence, P (software fails) < P (software imperfect).
In calculations such as this, it is generally the probability of imperfection that is most useful. We often write of a probability of (im)perfection to refer ambiguously to both. Another attractive attribute of possible perfection arises in two-channel systems, such as those used in aircraft or, in different form, for nuclear shutdown. In aircraft, it is common to have a highly complex "operational" channel, which is a system that actually provides the function concerned (e.g., fuel management, autopilot etc.), and a much simpler "monitor" channel that looks for safety violations and triggers higherlevel fault recovery when necessary. As explained earlier, in the context of N -version software, we cannot simply multiply the failure rates of the separate channels together to obtain the failure rate of the combined system because we cannot assume the failures of the two channels are independent. In contrast, it is established in [2] that failure of the operational channel and imperfection of the monitor channel are conditionally independent, and their probabilities can be multiplied together to yield a probability of failure for the combined system. We believe this analysis can be used to provide a rigorous underpinning for some of the architectures recommended in the guidelines for complex aircraft systems [13, Table 5-2] where, for example, it is suggested that a Level A system can be achieved by a Level C operational channel and a Level A monitor (with any coordination mechanism also required to be Level A).
The treatment of probabilities used above, both for failures and perfection, is deliberately informal and omits many important topics in probabilistic modeling. Technical details can be found in [2] . Our focus here is the application of these ideas to formal verification, and to do this it is necessary to introduce a little more of the background to probabilistic modeling: specifically, the distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty [16] .
Aleatory uncertainty, or "uncertainty in the world," can be thought of as "natural" uncertainty that is irreducible. For example, if we were to toss a coin we would not be able to predict with certainty whether it would fall as "heads" or as "tails." This uncertainty cannot be eliminated, and any predictions about future tosses of the coin can only be expressed as probabilities. This is true even when we know the probability of heads for a single toss of the coin, which we may denote p H ; when the coin is "fair," p H = 0.5. Real coins, of course, are not fair, so there will be uncertainty about the value of the parameter p H . This second uncertainty is epistemic uncertainty, or "uncertainty about the world." This uncertainty is reducible: in the case of the coin, we could toss it very many times and observe the frequency of heads in this sequence of tosses. That frequency is an estimate of p H and the estimate gets closer to the true value of p H as the number of observed tosses increases (there are limit theorems in probability that detail the nature of this convergence), so the uncertainty reduces.
In much scientific modeling, the aleatory uncertainty is captured conditionally in a model with unknown parameters, and the epistemic uncertainty centers upon the values of these parameters-as in the simple example of coin tossing. The analysis performed in (1) is an aleatory one, and is more properly presented as a model parameterized by the probability that the software is imperfect, which we denote p np and the probability that it fails, if it is imperfect, which we denote p f np . The conclusion to (1) is that the probability of system failure is given by p np × p f np . To apply this result, we need to assess actual values for these parameters in the particular system concerned. This constitutes the second, or epistemic stage of the analysis.
Probabilities in the aleatory analysis can be given a classical frequentist interpretation (by the technique of considering the software to be a sample drawn from the population of software that might have been developed), but the epistemic analysis most naturally employs the subjective interpretation, where probabilities reflect degrees of belief. The person or organization responsible for assessing the acceptability of the system concerned must formulate beliefs about the values of p f np and p np . Most likely these beliefs will not be independent (for example, beliefs about the probability of failure if imperfect may depend on the nature of the imperfection), so they will be represented by some joint distribution F (p f np , p np ) and the probability of system failure will then be given by the Riemann-Stieltjes integral
Elicitation of experts' subjective probabilities is an active research area in Bayesian statistics, and there have been considerable advances in recent years in techniques and tools [17] . However, it is likely to be considerably easier to elicit beliefs about single rather than joint distribution functions and so we generally seek arguments that could allow assessors to separate their beliefs. If this can be done, then F (p f np , p np ) factorizes as F (p f np ) × F (p np ) and (3) becomes P f np × P np where P f np and P np are the means of the posterior distributions representing the assessor's beliefs about the two parameters.
Arguments that can allow an assessor to separate his beliefs include conservative assumptions (e.g., the assumption used earlier that, if imperfect, the system will fail on every demand-effectively setting P f np = 1), and locating a probability mass C at the (1, 1) point (representing common factors that can affect both parameters) [2] .
The salient point, which we hope is clear even in this simplified presentation, is that possible perfection provides a bridge between the verification activities used to ensure correctness of software and the probabilistic estimates required for failure at the system level. Aleatory uncertainty is captured in a probabilistic model for the system, and epistemic uncertainty concerns the values of the parameters employed in the model. Through conservative assumptions and other modeling techniques, it is generally possible to eliminate dependencies between epistemic assessments of the various parameters. One of the independent parameters will be the probability of imperfection for the software concerned, which represents the assessor's beliefs about the (im)perfection of the software. In the next section, we consider how evidence of formal verification can be used in formulating these beliefs.
III. FORMAL VERIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABILITY OF PERFECTION
We are interested in the extent to which formal methods, and formal verification in particular, can contribute to an evaluator's assignment of a probability of (im)perfection to a body of software. The assignment will take place in the larger context of an overall assessment of the system concerned, which, nowadays, is generally grounded in an argumentbased safety or assurance case (see, for example [18] - [22] ). Such a case begins with claims that enumerate the undesired loss events and the tolerable failure rate or risk associated with them (e.g., "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP) [23] , or "so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one type" [3, paragraph 9.e(3)]). Evidence about the system and its processes of construction are developed, and an argument is constructed to justify satisfaction of the claims, based on the evidence. This process may recurse through subsystems, with substantiated claims about a subsystem being used as evidence in a parent case.
Elsewhere [24] , [25] , we begin to develop a case that techniques from formal verification can be used to provide mechanized support for the arguments in an assurance case, but here our focus is on use of formal verification to establish claims about a body of software; those claims are assumed to be used as evidence within the larger assurance case.
By formal verification, we mean construction of formal statements for the claims made about the software, formal specification of the software itself, and a proof that the latter achieves the former. The proof is generated or checked by tools that use the techniques of automated deduction, such as theorem proving, including SAT and SMT solving, model checking, and so on [26] . The verification tools may require interactive human guidance, or may be fully automated (e.g., using automated abstraction and invariant discovery), but it is the tools that guarantee the proof.
The formal specifications that are subjected to verification may describe the abstract design of the software and its algorithms, or detailed models taken from a model-based design framework, or the executable code, or all of these.
In addition, there may be formalizations of the non-software elements that are part of the system in which the software operates (e.g., its sensors and actuators and the physical processes that they monitor and control, and any human operators and their mental models [27] and cognitive states), and the external environment that may interact with the system (e.g., by injecting faults). The claims verified may range from simple absence of runtime anomalies, such as those guaranteed by static analysis, to full functional correctness with respect to a detailed requirements specification.
We are interested in the subjective probability of perfection that might be assigned to software that has been formally verified in this way. The assignment will obviously consider the strengths of the guarantees delivered by formal verification and so it is important to examine the main hazards to the soundness of these guarantees.
The first hazard is that the basic requirements or assumptions for the system may have been misunderstood or established incorrectly. This seems to be the dominant source of failure in safety-critical systems: the software is built to the wrong requirements (see, e.g., recent aircraft incident and accident reports [28] - [32] ). We anticipate that software that is subjected to formal verification, and which is used in a context for which a probability of perfection is required, will be relatively small and simple and will be for safety monitoring and backup purposes (essentially, to guard against failures of this very type in the mainline operational software). The requirements for software such as this are taken directly from the safety case, so any errors here reflect flaws in the safety case and invalidate far more than the software: they call the entire system and its certification into question. Consequently, we regard this hazard as falling outside the purview of formal verification.
The second hazard definitely is within that purview: it is that the requirements, assumptions, or design may be formalized incorrectly or incompletely. There are three subcases to this concern. 1) Elements of the specification may be inconsistent: this renders the specification meaningless and it becomes possible to prove anything. Constructive specifications in a suitable specification framework (e.g., one that requires, among other things, demonstration that all recursive functions are well-founded) are conservative extensions of their logic and therefore always consistent (if the base logic is) [33] . ACL2 [34] , Coq [35] , HOL [36] , and Isabelle [37] are examples of verification systems (i.e., theorem provers for logics that are suitable for system specification and verification tasks) that favor constructive specifications. However, constructive specifications are not always appropriate; for example, when specifying assumptions, it is generally more appropriate to express them as axioms (we wish to state the assumptions, not implement them). In this case, consistency of the axioms may be ensured by showing that they have a model that is conservative (e.g., defined constructively). The PVS verification system [38] , for example, supports this kind of demonstration through theory interpretations [39] . 2) Elements of the specification may be just plain wrong:
although logically consistent, they do not correctly formalize the requirements, design, or assumptions. This is generally the dominant hazard in formal specification and analysis. Formal specifications that have not been subject to some form of mechanized analysis are no more likely to be correct than programs that have never been run (in fact, less so, since nonspecialists generally have better intuition about programs than they do about formal specifications). When a number of unmechanized specifications in the Z language (including some of industrial significance) were subjected to mechanized analysis, most were found to contain flaws [40] .
The most effective ways to ensure that formal specifications capture their intent are to "challenge" them by attempting to prove putative theorems (i.e., "if I've got it right, this ought to follow, but that ought to yield a counterexample"), or to explore the behavior of executable interpretations of the specification: some constructive logics are directly executable, and a large fragment even of PVS's higher order logic with quantifiers can be evaluated efficiently (i.e., at speeds comparable to those of a functional programming language) [41] .
Some verification systems, such as PVS, identify all the axioms and definitions on which a formally verified conclusion depends: if these are correct, then logical validity of the verified conclusion follows by soundness of the verification system. Such identification allows particular scrutiny to be applied to these elements. The axioms and definitions that underpin a verification are generally of two kinds: those that are directly concerned with the subject matter of the system (its requirements, design, assumptions, and so on), and those used in developing the various theories that are required to express this subject matter (e.g., the theories of clocks, synchronous systems, ordinal numbers, and so on). Many of the latter theories will be widely used in other formal developments, so the burden of ensuring their correctness is supported by a broadly shared social process.
Even if a theory or specification is formalized incorrectly, it does not necessarily invalidate all theorems that use it: only if the verification actually exploits the incorrectness will the validity of the theorem be in doubt (and even then, it could still be true, but unproven). The author has performed many formal verifications and flaws in some of his specifications have been identified by others [42] , but in no case did these flaws invalidate the theorems claimed.
3) The formal specification and verification may be discontinuous or incomplete. Discontinuities can arise when several analysis tools are applied in the same software development (e.g., a theorem prover, a model checker, a source code static analyzer, and formally-based security and timing analyzers). Concerns are that different tools may ascribe different semantics to the same specification, translations between notations may introduce flaws, and there may be unintended gaps that allow some aspect to escape analysis. There is no simple resolution to these concerns: combinations of specialized analysis tools are outstripping the capabilities and performance of monolithic tools and seem to represent the future of the field. Integrating frameworks such as an "Evidential Tool Bus" [26] suggest one way forward.
The most significant incompleteness is generally the gap between the most detailed level of specification that is formally analyzed (e.g., algorithms expressed in a functional programming notation, or a model-based design using state machines) and the input (e.g., C code and "make" files) to the software development environment that generates executable code. Manual translation between these notations may introduce faults, and assumptions in the formal development (e.g., interpretation of mathematical functions such as sqrt) may be violated by the execution environment (e.g., due to finite precision).
These concerns can obviously be reduced by making the formal analysis as complete as possible, but they can also be addressed by comprehensive testing on the execution platform. Automatic generation of test cases is a popular application of formal methods [43] , [44] and the tests can target specific coverage criteria, such as MC/DC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) [45] which is required for safety critical software in commercial aircraft (i.e., DO-178B Level A [14] ).
A plausible approach could be one that makes the formal analysis as comprehensive as reasonably practicable, and then employs automated test generation from the lowest level formal specification (which also serves as the test oracle) to provide evidence that the execution behavior precisely matches this specification. Testing also provides assurance against bugs in the software development environment (e.g., the C compiler and its libraries) and in the execution environment (e.g., the hardware, loaders and linkers, and libraries), and is therefore desirable in any case.
In an ideal world, the execution environment would itself be provided with strong evidence of correctness, such as that provided by formal verification. Research projects have accomplished impressive feats in formally verifying such "stacks" of software and hardware [46] , but most applications today must rely on informal evidence from extensive and widespread use of their execution platforms, buttressed by testing of their specific configurations.
Even when formal verification is truly comprehensive, thorough testing is still required because it probes the assumptions under which the verification was performed. The "penetration testing" performed on secure systems explicitly targets assumptions documented in the formal verification, as these are considered to highlight the most attractive points of attack. Any failure discovered in final testing (as opposed to exploratory testing undertaken earlier in development) calls the whole system assurance into question. The third and final hazard we consider is that a theorem prover, model checker, or other mechanized formal analysis tool employed in the verificaiton may be unsound.
The concern here is that it may prove a false theorem, not that it may fail to prove a true one (that is completeness). Theorem provers are complex programs (often far more complex and sophisticated than the specifications and programs that they verify), and concern about their soundness is generally the dominant concern for nonspecialists ("who will guard the guardians"?).
There are several ways to mechanize theorem proving in support of verification. In one way, a search is performed to find a rule of inference that will move things forward from the current proof state. The search may be massive, but soundness depends only on correct application of the selected inference rule (which includes checking that it is applicable). Some theorem provers (generally referred to as "LCF-style" [47] ) are deliberately designed to have a very small core set of fairly primitive rules; larger sets of more powerful rules can be defined in terms of these, but soundness depends only on the kernel code that implements the core rules. The hope is that a small kernel has a high probability of attaining perfection, and may even be proved correct. Indeed, the kernel of HOL Light, which is about 400 lines of OCAML, has been proven sound by a stronger version of itself [48] (by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, a sound theorem prover cannot prove its own soundness, so strengthening is needed).
An objection to the LCF-style approach is that it is inefficient: the overhead (which can be exponential) of reducing a big proof step down to invocations of many core rules is always present, even when the prover is being used for the purpose of "exploration" in the early stages of proof development, rather than for final assurance. An alternative approach is for an untrusted theorem prover to generate "proof logs" that can be certified by an independent trusted checker; the overhead of log generation and checking can be turned off when not required. There is a tension between the size of the proof log and the complexity of the trusted checker: traditionally, the checker has been very simple, and the log correspondingly huge and expensive to generate. Recent work suggests the feasibility of more powerful checkers (in effect, small theorem provers), which are themselves formally verified [49] . These checkers can use much more succinct logs (little more than hints), and confidence in their own verification can be based on one-time use of more primitive checkers or on a diversity of checkers or verifiers. Diverse verifiers are available for certain standard classes of verification problems such as those that can be reduced to SAT and SMT solving.
We have enumerated three major hazards to the trustworthiness of the guarantees provided by formal verification.
The first of these (incorrect requirements) is not specific to formal approaches (in fact, formal analysis could help reduce this hazard by "challenging" the requirements against putative theorems), and can therefore be removed from this calculation. The second hazard (incorrect or incomplete formalization) has three subcases and the first of these (inconsistency) can be eliminated by suitable technical methods (exhibiting constructive models).
The remaining, active, hazards are incorrect and incomplete formalizations (the second and third subcases of the second hazard), and flaws in the verification system itself (the third hazard).
We cannot suggest specific contributions from each of these active hazards to an assessed probability of imperfection, but we can suggest their likely relative significance. Based on personal experience, errors in formalization should be the dominant concern: the verification can be sound and complete but may not mean what we think it means. As described earlier, formalizations should be "challenged" in various ways, such as by proving putative theorems, checking counterexamples to nontheorems, and direct execution. Incompleteness should be the next level of concern. Some formal verification activities are deliberately very incomplete (e.g., static code analysis) and these may be unable to contribute very much at all to a probability of imperfection. But for those verifications that are reasonably comprehensive, it is important to consider what might have "fallen through the cracks" and to weigh the guarantee of formal verification accordingly. Finally, the possibility of flaws in the verification system itself is the least of the three concerns: although all the major verification systems have had some flaws, no false claim has "escaped" and been used in a larger context, to my knowledge.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We reviewed Bev Littlewood's idea that software may be "possibly perfect" and that its probability of (im)perfection may be assessed. Possible perfection is a more plausible claim than either absolute correctness or reliability for the assurance delivered by most software verification and validation activities. Furthermore, the probability of (im)perfection provides a bridge from these correctness-based activities to the probabilistic claims generally employed at the system level.
In [2] , we show that the possible imperfection of one channel is conditionally independent of the failures of another, and hence that the overall failure rate of suitable two-channel systems is the product of the separate probabilities of these events. This approach can be applied to primary/backup systems for nuclear safety, and operational/monitor systems for aircraft.
We considered use of evidence from formal verification in assessing a probability of imperfection. We enumerated hazards to the soundness of the guarantees provided by formal verification and concluded that incorrect formalization (of software requirements and specifications, and of assumptions) and incomplete formalization and analysis (so that issues may "fall through the cracks") are the dominant concerns, with soundness of the verification system a distant third. We suggested ways to reduce each of these hazards.
To make these proposals concrete, we may consider a dualchannel system for which an assessor can substantiate a claim of 10 −4 for probability of failure of the reliable channel. A balanced case suggests we should require similar probability of imperfection for the possibly perfect channel (thereby achieving an overall probability of failure of 10 −8 ). We suggest that the bulk of this "budget" should be divided between the concerns of incorrect formalization and incompleteness of the formal analysis, with a small fraction, say 10 −5 , allocated to unsoundness of the verification system.
We believe that through sufficiently careful and comprehensive formal challenges, it is indeed feasible and plausible that an assessor can assign a subjective posterior probability of imperfection on the order of 10 −4 to the formal statements on which a formal verification depends. Through testing and other scrutiny, we believe a similar figure can be assigned to the probability of imperfection due to discontinuities and incompleteness in the formal analysis. And, by use of a verification system with a trusted or verified kernel, or trusted, verified, or diverse checkers, we believe an assessor can assign a posterior probability of 10 −5 or smaller to the concern that the theorem prover and other components of the mechanized formal verification system may have incorrectly verified the theorems that attest to perfection.
Dual-channel systems are subject to two kinds of failure: the first is where both channels fail to operate safely; the second is where one channel activates a safety action (e.g., shuts down a reactor or signals failure of an avionics system) unnecessarily. Probabilities of imperfection on the order of 10 −3 or 10 −4 seem adequate for the verified channel in the first case (because its imperfection is conditionally independent of failure of the other channel). The safety consequences of the second kind of failure are generally less severe than the first, so probabilities of imperfection in the range 10 −3 to 10 −4 may be adequate here, too. However, other cases may require smaller probabilities of imperfection, such as 10 −6 or even less (these could also be required some single-channel systems), and it is a topic for investigation and discussion whether such assessments should be considered feasible and credible.
Topics for further investigation include dialog with assessors and certifiers on application of these ideas in real systems assessments. Concrete attempts to assign specific probabilities of imperfection to real systems will reveal areas of difficulty and doubt, and future research should explore technical means to alleviate these.
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